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Abstract 
The capital adequacy requirement of banks shifted in March, 2007 from Basel I to Basel II. In Basel II, exact 
measurement of credit risk is adopted, and banks choose between a standardized approach (SA) and an internal 
ratings-based approach (IRBA). In general, the IRBA is a more risk-sensitive capital requirement measurement than 
the SA and Basel I. Theoretical modeling in related literatures implies that since the IRBA depends on the probability 
of default, a downturn implies a higher capital requirement, meaning that the IRBA is pro-cyclical to the business 
cycle. The purpose of this paper is to verify the effects of the IRBA on bank lending through empirical analysis. 
Although the empirical analysis here cannot confirm the pro-cyclicality of the IRBA, it does allow the proposal of a 
benchmark for the effects of this approach. The effect we estimate is the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated 
(ATT), and the estimation method adopted is difference-in-difference propensity score matching (DID-PSM). Using 
this method, we can confirm the real effects of the IRBA. The results are that in 2006-2007 when bank balance-sheets 
were favorable, the ATT are negative, but all these are insignificant, on the other hand, in 2006-2008 when the 
balance-sheets were infuluenced by the subprime-loan crisis, the ATT are negative and significant, and smaller than it 
in 2006-2008. Thus, we cannot say that the IRBA has the pro-cyclicality exactly.
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     1. Introduction
The capital adequacy requirement of banks shifted in March, 2007 from Basel
I to Basel II1. In Basel II, while the minimum capital requirement is 8%,
exact measurement of credit risk is adopted, and banks choose between a
standardized approach (SA) and an internal ratings-based approach (IRBA)2.
The SA is a method in which part of Basel I is modiﬁed. As note in details, it
plans measuring the risk precisely using the external ratings and considering
the diversiﬁcation eﬀects of assets while succeeding to a conventional Basel
I framework in which it calculates the risk assets based total asset on the
ﬁnancial accounting. Thus, the SA is more risk-sensitive than Basel I which
gives the same risk weight on various assets. The IRBA is more risk-sensitive
than the SA, since it reﬂects borrowers’ risk more precisely using the bank’s
own internal ratings.
The purpose of this paper is to verify diﬀerences in lending behavior among
banks adopting the IRBA and the SA. In general, it is considered that the
IRBA depends on the probability of default. Since this correlates with cycli-
cal factors of business, it raises or falls with every business cycle. Thus, a
downturn implies a higher capital requirement, because calculations in Basel
II are based on the probability of default. An increase in the capital-asset
ratio reduces the volume of bank loans, which in turn reduces consumption
and investment. This is a general pro-cyclical eﬀect of the IRBA, and sev-
eral related literatures have veriﬁed this through theoretical modeling. In
particular, Repullo and Suarez (2004, 2007) proposed a dynamic equilibrium
model introducing bank lending behavior, veriﬁed the pro-cyclicality of cap-
ital adequacy requirement, and evaluated the eﬀects of the minimum capital
requirement under Basel I and Basel II. They set the model as follow; banks
anticipate that shocks changing the current business cycle can impair their
capacity to lend in the future, and as a precaution they continue to hold the
capital used as a buﬀers against debt exposure. The authors also show that,
1Although Japan adopted Basel II in March, 2007, the European Union (EU) did not do so until the end
of 2008, and the United States plans execution for the end of 2009
2A denominator in the capital-asset ratio measurement of Basel II includes market and operational risk
in addition to credit risk. Operational risk is newly added variable in Basel II, and deals with the risk of
loss due to accidents, system glitch, and illegal acts.
1regardless of banks’ accumulation of precautionary buﬀers, credit crunch con-
ditions in Basel II became more severe than those in Basel I3 .
As mentioned above, several related literatures verify the pro-cyclicality of
Basel II through theoretical modeling. However, there appears to be a lack
of literatures that veriﬁes the eﬀects of Basel II or the IRBA on bank lend-
ing using empirical analysis. A wide variety of related literature deals with
behavior of Japan’s banks through empirical analysis (e.g. Sasaki (1998) and
Ogawa (2003)). Ogawa (2003) tried to verify the eﬀects of capital adequacy
and non-performing loans using bank panel data. Ogawa (2003) performed
estimation considering a Lagrange multiplier related to the capital adequacy
requirement for the diﬀerence between the minimum capital requirement and
the actual capital-asset ratio under a condition where banks are assumed to
maximize proﬁts. The results indicated that the capital adequacy require-
ment reduced the amount of loans issued. However, these studies were based
on Basel I rather than Basel II4.
Fortunately, in Japan, although two periods concerned are limited 2007
and 2008, we can compare the eﬀects of the IRBA and the SA. These periods
are insuﬃcient to verify the pro-cyclicality of the IRBA, but we can assess
how credit risk measurement aﬀects lending according to banks’ balance-
sheets. Although these balance-sheets were comparatively favorable in 2007,
their condition deteriorated in 2008 under the inﬂuence of the sub-prime
loan crisis. Accordingly, this paper seeks to verify the eﬀects of credit risk
measurement on lending, and to proposes a benchmark between credit risk
measurement and banks’ lending behavior.
When verifying such eﬀects, it is important to grasp how diﬀerences in
lending would appear in two theoretical situations where the same bank
adopted the IRBA and the SA, respectively. In general, the Average Treat-
ment Eﬀect on the Treated (ATT) is used to estimate such diﬀerences. ATT is
a convenient concept for evaluating policy eﬀects, but appropriate techniques
are required to consistently estimate this metric. In this case, the problem is
3Related literatures verifying the pro-cyclicality of Basel II through modeling includes Estrella (2004) and
Gordy and Howells (2006).
4We cannot conrm the papers arguing the IRBA and SA at present
2that we cannot check lending (i.e. the outcome) when banks using the IRBA
adopts the SA. Accordingly, we must make a counterfactual corresponding to
lending in which banks choose the SA. One method of achieving this is to use
the outcome of banks that adopt the SA. However, the choice of measurement
method may be inﬂuences by bank characteristics. In fact, high ﬁxed costs
are incurred in adopting the IRBA option. Thus, there is a possibility that
accurate estimation cannot be performed simply by substituting the outcome
of the SA5 . To solve these problems, we use matching estimation based on
the propensity score proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and Heck-
man, Ichimura, and Todd (1997). Using this method allows the elimination
of the selection bias.
It is also considered that banks’ own heterogeneous eﬀects inﬂuence the es-
timation results. However, if these heterogeneities are constant over time, we
can eliminate estimation bias from diﬀerencing in outcomes. Here, we there-
fore use diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence matching estimation based on the propensity
score (DID-PSM) to verify the diﬀerence between the real eﬀects of the IRBA
and the SA.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows; In Section 2, we give a
simple introduction to the capital adequacy ratio measurement of Basel II
and credit risk measurement. In particular, we preset the relations between
the credit risk measurement and the business cycle. In Section 3, we analyze
the average treatment eﬀects of the IRBA using bank micro-data for Japan.
Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper. Also, in Appendix, we present the
ATT theory and several methods of estimating it.
2. Credit risk measurement and the business cycle
Basel II uses a three pillars concept, which is a framework that utilizes the
self-discipline of ﬁnancial institutions and market discipline complimentarily
along with capital adequacy regulation. The ﬁrst pillar consists of minimum
capital requirement and monitoring methods with objectivity to secure the
soundness of banks, the second pillar consists of self-discipline based on banks’
5These problems are known as selection bias. See Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and Imbens (2003)
3own risk management and supervisory reviews, and third pillar is market
discipline. In particular, we focus on the second pillar.
Banks choose the measurement method for ”credit risk” and ”operational
risk” according to the characteristics of their own activities or risk-management
techniques. Here, we focus on credit risk management6 . One of the three
following credit risk measurement methods is selected;
1. The Standardized Approach: This method calculates the capital require-
ment by multiplying assets by the risk weight according to external credit
assessment or banks’ internal rating systems for credit risk.
2. The Foundation Internal Ratings-Based Approach: This method mea-
sures credit risk more precisely by using banks’ own internal ratings with
respect to borrowers’ creditworthiness. The risk components involved in
determining the capital requirement for a given exposure include mea-
surements of the probability of default (PD), loss given default (LGD),
exposure at default (EAD), and eﬀective maturity (M). In this method,
banks estimate only borrowers’ PD, input it into a functional formula
set by a supervisory party, measure the expected loss (EL) and the un-
expected loss (UL) from the anticipated maximum loss, and calculate
this as the minimum capital requirement. LGD and EAD are set by a
supervisory party.
3. The Advanced Internal Ratings-Based Approach: Banks are required to
self-calculate all of PD, LGD, and EAD.
One feature of the IRBA is a higher capital requirement when the levels of
PD, LGD, and EAD are higher.
6One of the following operational risk management methods is selected.
1. The Basic Indicator Approach: This method calculates operational risk by multiplying the gross
income of banks by a factor (15%)
2. The Standardized Approach: Banks' activities are divided into eight business lines, and the capital
charge for each line is calculated by multiplying the gross income of banks by factors (12%, 15%, 18%)
assigned to these business lines.
3. The Advanced Measurement Approach: This method involves calculation based on banks' internal
operational risk measurement systems.
4The diﬀerence between the IRBA and the SA is that the former introduces
the calculation of UL. While EL is deﬁned simply as PDLGDEAD, UL
is deﬁned as the Maximum loss   EL. UL is the minimum capital require-
ment. Additionally, UL depends not only on PD, LGD, EAD, and M, but
also on the correlation coeﬃcient, which shows the degree of defaults simul-
taneously depending on common factors such as the business cycle. Finally,
the formula for credit risk (capital requirement) with the IRBA is Capital
requirement = UL  M adjustment. Accordingly, the capital requirement
in credit risk measurement ﬂuctuates depending not only on PD and LGD,
but also on the correlation coeﬃcient. In great recessions characterized by
a large decline of assets (such as those seen in recent years), the capital re-
quirement reduces the volume of loans. Thus, in theoretical models such as
Repullo and Suarez (2004, 2007), as mentioned above, it is pointed out that
the risk-sensitive IRBA is pro-cyclical to the business cycle.
3. Empirical analysis
3.1. Data
In this section, using Japanese bank micro-data available from the Federation
of Bankers’ Associations of Japan, we assess the ATT of the IRBA using
DID-PSM estimation. The notation show the binary variable CRE (which
is denoted by 1 if bank i adopts the IRBA and by 0 if it adopts the SA), the
bank loan-deposit ratio corresponding to outcome DL, the non-performing
loan ratio BL, and the bank capital-asset ratio CR.
Fortunately, we can use 2007 and 2008 data for Japan, whereas 2006 data
are used for the period before the adoption of the IRBA. Thus, ATT used for
analysis are E
(
∆DL1;07 06   ∆DL0;07 06) and E
(
∆DL1;08 06   ∆DL0;08 06).
The numbers of banks found using this analysis is 119.
In this analysis, we use a logit model to derive the estimated propensity
score ˆ P. The results of logit model estimation are presented in Table 1.
We also tested the balancing property of the propensity score. The null
hypothesis of balancing property states that the means of each character
should not diﬀer between treated and control units.
5Table 1: Logit model estimation
Variable 2006-2007 2006-2008
lnBL  0:2258 (0:0521)  0:7283 (0:2407)
lnBL2 0:0425 (0:0312) 0:0784 (0:0692)
lnCR 3:1764 (1:0034) 2:2686 (0:9543)
lnCR2  0:5698 (0:2210)  0:4489 (0:1934)
Pseudo R2 0:3258 0:1928
Log likelihood  42:9989  55:4447
Number of observation 119 119
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy that indicates whether the bank choose the IRBA
or the SA. Figures in parentheses represent standard errors, , ,    denotes statistical
signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
3.2. Estimation results
The results of estimation are presented in Table 2. The values presented in
this table are the ATT, E
(
∆DL1;07 06   ∆DL0;07 06) and E
(
∆DL1;08 06  
∆DL0;08 06).That is, negative value means that the loan when bank adopt
the IRBA is smaller than it when adopting the SA. Thus, when economy is
recessions, if this value is negative then it implies that the IRBA is possibly
pro-cyclical to the business cycle.
Table 2: Matching estimation
Propensity score metrics 2006-2007 2006-2008
One-to-one matching  0:0304 (0:0603)  0:1053 (0:0462)
Five-nearest-neighbor matching  0:0426 (0:0369)  0:0922 (0:0334)
Caliper matching 0:0163 (0:0665)  0:968 (0:0438)
Kernel matching  0:0167 (0:0719)  0:1016 (0:0410)
Number of treated 18 20
In 2006-2007, all ATT vaules for the IRBA in bank lending, excepting the
caliper matching, are negative, but all these are insigniﬁcant. Thus, in this
period, we cannot get the clear results. Here, we consider about the ATT
6values. It can be considered that bank balance-sheet during this period were
favorable and that bank lending was not risky. In general, when the economy
is relatively stable, the pro-cyclicality means the increase of the bank loan.
However, in this estimation, even when economy is relatively stable, the IRBA
functions to decrease the bank loan. That is, when economy is stable, the
IRBA has not pro-cyclicality. But this estimation implies that the ATT is
insigniﬁcant.
In 2006-2008, all matching estimations indicate that the eﬀect of the IRBA
on bank lending is negative and signiﬁcant. During this period, the balance-
sheets of banks were inﬂuenced by the subprime-loan crisis originating in the
United States. In particular, the Nikkei-Heikin stock market index dipped
below 10;000 yen in September 2009, causing the balance-sheets of bank
holding large quantities of marketable securities to deteriorate further. Thus,
for banks adopting the IRBA, while the numerator of the capital-asset ratio
formula was small, they needed to reduce risk assets (the denominator) in
order to maintain a uniform capital adequacy ratio. Accordingly, in this
period, we can consider that the diﬀerence between the IRBA and the SA
is negative and signiﬁcant. Also, in this period, the value of ATT is smaller
than it in 2006-2007.
Related literatures on banks’ optimization problems, including bank cap-
ital, have implies that the adoption of the IRBA must accumulate capital
and reduce the volume of loans, which in turn reduces consumption and
investment. Thus, in the theoretical model, it is shown that the IRBA is
pro-cyclical to the business cycle. While it is not possible to verify the pro-
cyclicality of the IRBA here, this paper shows that the approach reduces the
volume of loans in recessions. However, it should be noted that if the IRBA
fulﬁlls the role of performing early correction of banks automatically, then
it may assist economic recovery from business depression at an early stage,
although it may makes the recession more serious in the short term.
4. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we verify the eﬀects of the IRBA on bank lending. This ap-
proach is a risk-sensitive measurement, and it is expected that banks adopting
7it will reduce risk assets to achieve the minimum capital requirement in terms
of recession. In fact, many studies (e.g. Repullo and Suarez (2004, 2007))
point out that its eﬀects are correlated to business cycle; that is, the eﬀects are
pro-cyclical. Accordingly, we veriﬁed the inﬂuence of the IRBA through em-
pirical analysis using bank micro-data for Japan. The estimation method we





∆DL1;08 06   ∆DL0;08 06) by it.
In terms of results, we were able to conﬁrm that the eﬀects of the IRBA on
bank lending were negative and signiﬁcant for the 2006-2008 and insigniﬁcant
for the 2006-2007. Also, the ATT for 2006-2008 is smaller than it for 2006-
2007, that is, E
(
∆DL1;08 06   ∆DL0;08 06) < E
(
∆DL1;07 06   ∆DL0;07 06).
In the later, since balance-sheets were relatively sound, it can be considered
that the loan situation of banks adopting the IRBA shown no great reaction
to credit risk. Then, in this period, while the ATT is negative, it is insignif-
icant. However, in general, the IRBA is pro-cyclical to the business cycle in
theoretical frameworks. This estimation result implies that even when the
economy is stable, the IRBA decreases the bank loan, that is, the IRBA is
not pr-cyclical. On the other hand, the recession originating in the United
States began to appear in 2008, and the worldwide economy sustained serious
damage. It can therefore be stated that banks adopting the IRBA judge an
increased level of risk and restrained their issuance of loans. Then, we can
say that in the recession the IRBA is pro-cyclical.
As mentioned above, the IRBA decreases the bank loan regardless of the
situation of the economy. Thus, we cannot exactly say that the IRBA is pro-
cyclical to the business cycle. However, these results do not imply that the
IRBA has many problems, and it is considered that accurate calculation of
risk can secures the soundness of banks and mitigate the acuteness of recession
conditions. It will take time to clarify the eﬀects of the IRBA in the current
ﬁnancial crisis. However, if banking soundness can be shared worldwide, the
global economy will be able to recover from the ﬁnancial crisis at an early
stage, so the prompting of temporary economic deterioration is a necessary
that can be withstood.
8Appendix
In this appendix, we describe about the estimation of ATT based on DID-
PSM. Since estimating ATT, enables conﬁrmation of diﬀerences in loans dis-
bursed by identical banks between cases in which the IRBA is adopted and
those in which it is not, allows us to determine the real eﬀects of this ap-
proach. In general, average treatment eﬀect is 1   0 written as follow;
DLi = 0 + Xi + CREi
(
1   0) + CREi
(
u1i   u0i) + u0i (1)
To estimate eq.(1) with a general regression model, it is necessary for either




  CREi = 1
}
= 0 to be satisﬁed, where situation
(i) implies that the eﬀects of the IRBA are the same for bank i, which has
the same Xi, and situation (ii) implies that even if the eﬀects are diﬀerent
between the banks, this diﬀerence does not aﬀect the selection of the approach
adopted.
However, the problems are cases where assumption (i) and (ii) does not
hold, i.e., the eﬀect of the IRBA is diﬀerent between the banks, and the adop-
tion of measurement methods is decided based on the idiosyncratic eﬀect. In
this case, the OLS and instrumental variable (IV) approach loses its validity.
As shown in Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997), however, the PSM and
DID-PSM estimation methods can solve these problems.
A.1. Propensity score matching estimation
Matching estimation is a method that matches samples (treated units) adopt-
ing the IRBA to similar samples (control units) that adopt the SA with re-
spect to X, and estimates the eﬀects of the IRBA by evaluating the diﬀerence
in outcome DL. In using this estimation, it is not necessary to assume the
outcome speciﬁcation and the form of the error term, and we can restrain
bias increase by matching the erroneous speciﬁcation at the minimum value.
While several assumptions are required in order to estimate the eﬀects of
the IRBA with matching estimations, we need only the following assumption








7In general, a matching estimation is set with following assumptions;
9The problem is that while setting the many characters of X, it is diﬃcult
to search for control units. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) propose matching
estimation based on the propensity score as a method of solving this problem.







. If the probability is the same, then X have identi-
cal distributions for treated and control units, because the decision of whether
or not to adopt the IRBA is random. That is, if the conditional probability
P is the same, the outcome DL0 is the same on average among treated and

















    CRE = 1;P(X)
}
is called the propensity score and is esti-
mated with logit or probit models.
If eq.(2) and eq.(3) are satisﬁed, then we can express ATT as follows
and perform consistently estimation, matching treated units to control units




















  CREi = 0;P(Xi)
}  
  CREi = 1
}
(4)
The ﬁrst problem is whether or not whether eq.(2) holds. To solve this,
Dehejia and Whaba (1999, 2002) proposed a test based on balancing proper-
ties; using this test, they suggested that the bias of matching estimation can
be mitigated. The second problem is searching for matching control units,
because the probability of observing two units with exactly the same propen-
sity score is zero. The methods to solve this problem are, for example, caliper
matching and the kernel matching.
1. DL0;DL1 ? CREjX







Assumption 1 implies that controlling the characters of X and the distribution of outcome DL are inde-
pendent of the binary variable CRE, which denotes program participation. Assumption 2 implies that for
all characters of X, conditions with and without participants are necessary so that a counterfactual - for
participants always exists for the condition without participants.
10A.2. DID-PSM estimation
The disadvantage of cross-sectional matching is that eq.(3) is not satisﬁed if
and only if the factors that cannot be explained by X aﬀect decision-making.
Thus, since eq.(3) is not satisﬁed, the matching estimation is not consistent.
If this inﬂuence is based on unobservable heterogeneity, that is constant
over time, such as individual potential ability, then we can obtain a consistent
matching estimator from diﬀerences in DL. In this case, we must observe the
treated and control units in at least two periods before and after the adoption
of the IRBA. That is, if bank i adopts the IRBA in period t, then the periods
we must observe are t   1 and t + m, where m  0. This is the DID-PSM
estimation method provided by Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997), and















where, ∆DLt+m = DLt+m   DLt 1. so ∆DLt+m represents m + 1 order dif-
ferencing. The advantage of the DID-PSM estimator is that we can eliminate
individual eﬀects independent of time. In fact, Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd
(1997) shown that the DID-PSM estimator performs better than the PSM
estimator based on cross-sectional data.
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